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Abstract 
Does science move toward truths? Are present scientific theories (approximately) true? 
Should we invoke truths to explain the success of science? Do our cognitive faculties track 
truths? Some philosophers say yes, while others say no, to these questions. Interestingly, both 
groups use the same scientific theory, viz., evolutionary theory, to defend their positions. I 
argue that it begs the question for the former group to do so because their positive answers 
imply that evolutionary theory is warranted, whereas it is self-defeating for the latter group to 
do so because their negative answers imply that evolutionary theory is unwarranted. 
 
Keywords 
Goal of Science, Success of Science, Evolutionary (Debunking) Arguments 
 
Seungbae Park 
Division of General Studies 
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology 
Republic of Korea 
nature@unist.ac.kr  
 
Acknowledgement: I thank the anonymous referees of this journal for their useful comments. 
This paper was completed while I was visiting Department of Philosophy, University of 
California – San Diego in 2015. I thank Craig Callender, the Department Chair, for his 
hospitality. 
 
1. Introduction 
Alexander Bird (2000) and Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970) rely on evolutionary theory to argue, 
respectively, that science moves and does not move toward truths. Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem 
(2013) claims that evolutionary theory goes along with her view that present theories are 
(approximately) true, while K. Brad Wray claims that it goes along with his view that present 
theories will be discarded. Stathis Psillos (1999) and Bas van Fraassen (1980) invoke 
evolutionary theory to give, respectively, a realist explanation and an antirealist explanation 
of the success of science. David Papineau (2006) capitalizes on evolutionary theory to show 
that our cognitive faculties track truths, while Kathleen Atkins (1996) uses it to show that 
they do not track truths.  
Is it legitimate to argue that evolutionary theory goes hand in hand with any of the 
preceding positions concerning the goal of science, the epistemic status of present theories, 
the success of science, and the capability of our cognitive faculties? I argue that the positive 
philosophical positions imply that evolutionary theory is warranted, whereas the negative 
philosophical positions imply that it is unwarranted. It follows that relying upon evolutionary 
theory is question-begging for the proponents of the former positions, and self-defeating for 
the proponents of the latter positions. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I critically respond to Bird and Kuhn 
on the issue of whether science moves toward truths; in Section 3, to Ruttkamp-Bloem and 
Wray on the issue of whether present theories are (approximately) true; in Section 4, to 
Psillos and van Fraassen on the issue of whether we should invoke truths to explain why 
science is successful; and in Section 5, to Papineau and Atkins on the issue of whether our 
cognitive faculties track truths. 
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We need to be clear about the structure of evolutionary theory before proceeding to 
criticize the various appeals to it. Its main frames are the tree of life and the principle of 
natural selection (Sober, 1993: 7). The tree of life depicts how present organisms are 
connected with past organisms. It illustrates, for example, that humans and frogs have 
descended from a common ancestor, viz., fish. Fish and plants have ultimately descended 
from single-celled organisms. Thus, single celled organisms are the ultimate common 
ancestor of all plants and animals on the Earth. The principle of natural selection is an 
assertion about how current terrestrial organisms have descended from the single-celled 
organisms. Natural selection occurs when the following three conditions are met. First, 
variations must occur. As a result of a variation, a random process, some organisms acquire a 
new trait. Second, the new trait must raise the fitness of organisms, i.e., it must raise the 
probability that the organisms survive and reproduce. Third, the new trait must be passed 
onto the next generation. If at least one of these three conditions is not satisfied, natural 
selection cannot occur (Sober, 1993: 9). Evolutionary biologists invoke both the tree of life 
and the principle of natural selection to explain biological phenomena. An example will be 
provided in the next section, where I criticize Bird’s appeal to evolutionary theory. 
 
2. The Goal of Science 
We once believed that the sun moves around the earth. We now believe that the earth moves 
around the sun. We once believed that a burning object releases phlogiston. We now believe 
that a burning object absorbs oxygen. An interesting question arises: Are we closer to truths 
than we were before? Bird (2000) relies on evolutionary theory to argue that science moves 
toward truths, whereas Kuhn (1962/1970) relies on the same scientific theory to argue that it 
does not. This section aims to show that it is question-begging for Bird, and self-defeating for 
Kuhn, to do so. 
Bird (2000: 211-113) claims that the evolution of scientific theories is analogous to that 
of organisms, in that science evolves toward truths just as organisms evolve toward a certain 
goal. To defend his view that organisms evolve toward a certain goal, he compares two 
models of evolutionary change: the two-species model and the one-species model. Let me 
explicate them. 
On the two-species model, one species evolves in response to how another species 
evolves. In the distant past, for example, cheetahs and gazelles were all slow runners. 
Variations occurred, and as a result, some cheetahs and gazelles were born with the ability to 
run faster. Fast cheetahs could hunt down slow gazelles, but slow cheetahs could not. As a 
result, fast cheetahs and gazelles tended to survive while slow cheetahs and gazelles tended to 
die. The ability to run fast was transmitted from one generation to the next via genes. Over 
many generations, fast cheetahs and gazelles survived, and slow ones died, and the average 
speed of both species increased. Cheetahs increased their average speed because gazelles 
increased their average speed, and vice versa. One species constantly increases in speed, as 
the other species does. Therefore, there is no fixed goal toward which these two species 
evolve. 
On the one-species model, however, a species evolves in a stable environment. In the 
distant past, for example, giraffes were all short, and they lived in an environment where the 
average height of trees did not change. A variation occurred, and as a result, some giraffes 
were born with long necks. Tall giraffes were more likely to survive and reproduce than short 
giraffes because the tall giraffes had access to leaves the short giraffes could not reach. Tall 
giraffes passed their phenotype to their offspring via genes. Over many generations, tall 
giraffes survived and short giraffes perished. The average height of giraffes increased as 
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variations accumulated. It is for this reason that current giraffes are tall. Giraffes evolve 
toward a fixed goal. The height of giraffes would stop increasing once it reached the optimum 
level because going over the optimum level would come with the cost of having to increase 
the sizes of the heart and other parts of the body. The one-species model yields a “more 
accurate analogy for the development of science” (Bird, 2000: 212). Thus, science evolves 
toward the fixed goal, viz., truths.
1
  
Is it justifiable for Bird to rely on the one-species model, a part of evolutionary theory, 
to establish his philosophical position that science converges on truths? To answer this 
question, we first need to take into account the distinction that Wray (2008: 323) and Moti 
Mizrahi (2013: 401) make. They distinguish between T1’s being close to the truth and T1’s 
being closer to the truth than T2. They argue that even if T1 is closer to the truth than T2, T1 
might be far from the truth. Suppose Alice and Bob are in San Francisco and that Alice is a 
step ahead of Bob in a race to Los Angeles. Of course, Alice is closer than Bob is to Los 
Angeles. Alice, however, is far from Los Angeles. Analogously, a scientific theory might be 
completely false, even if it is closer to the truth than its rival is. So, for example, even if the 
oxygen theory is closer to the truth than the phlogiston theory is, it might not even be 
approximately true. 
Wray and Mizrahi’s preceding distinction indicates that Bird’s position that science 
moves toward truths implies either that the one-species model is not even approximately true 
or that it is (approximately) true. Suppose that the one-species model is completely false. It 
would, then, be self-confuting for Bird to appeal to the one-species model, the completely 
false model, to justify his philosophical position that science converges on truths. To appeal 
to it would amount to claiming that it is completely false that science converges on truths. 
Suppose that the one-species model is (approximately) true. It is, then, question-begging for 
Bird to appeal to it to justify his position that science converges on truths. After all, his 
philosophical position implies that the one-species model is (approximately) true. To appeal 
to the one-species model to show that science moves toward truths amounts to appealing to p 
to justify p, i.e., to advancing a circular argument. Therefore, it is either self-defeating or 
question-begging for Bird to appeal to the one-species model to defend his philosophical 
position. It is more charitable, I believe, to interpret Bird as advancing a circular argument 
rather than a self-refuting argument. 
Let me now turn to Kuhn (1962/1970). For him, the development of science consists of 
certain stages. To speak briefly, different schools of thought compete with each other over 
fundamentals during the pre-paradigmatic stage. One of the schools successfully solves a 
puzzle. This success establishes a paradigm and normal science begins. Normal scientists 
dogmatically adhere to the paradigm, articulate it, and improve scientific instruments. As 
serious anomalies accumulate, revolutionary science begins. Revolutionary scientists 
question the old paradigm, and propose an alternative paradigm. As the new paradigm 
handles the anomalies which plagued the old paradigm, the new paradigm replaces the old, 
and new normal science begins. New normal science is followed by new anomalies and new 
revolutionary science; thus, the cycle of normal science and revolutionary science continues. 
Kuhn argues that as the cycle continues, science does not move toward truths. The 
development of science is a process free of a goal, just as natural selection in nature is a 
process free of a goal. Evolutionary theory denies that organisms evolve toward a goal set by 
either God or nature. Complex organisms are “products of a process that moved steadily from 
                                           
1
 In nature, however, a species interacts with other species, and the environment changes as continents move 
around. Thus, the one-species model has no application to nature. 
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primitive beginnings but toward no goal” (Kuhn, 1962/1970: 172). Similarly, the alternations 
between normal science and revolutionary science occur without a goal: 
 
And the entire process may have occurred, as we now suppose biological evolution did, without 
benefit of a set goal, a permanent fixed scientific truth, of which each stage in the development 
of scientific knowledge is a better exemplar. (Kuhn, 1962/1970: 172-173) 
 
Thus, it is wrong to think that the kinetic paradigm is closer to the truth than the caloric 
paradigm, or that the Einsteinian paradigm is closer to the truth than the Newtonian paradigm. 
The analogy between the evolution of organisms and the evolution of scientific ideas is “very 
nearly perfect” (Kuhn, 1962/1970: 172).  
What should we make of Kuhn’s contention that evolutionary theory dovetails with his 
account of the development of science? If his account of the development of science is true, 
present theories, including evolutionary theory, are not closer to truths than their predecessors. 
It follows that evolutionary theory is not closer to the truth than its predecessors and that 
evolutionary theory is just as false as its predecessors. Given that Kuhn’s account of the 
development of science goes hand in hand with evolutionary theory, a false scientific theory, 
it is also false. Note that the starting and ending point of this reasoning are, respectively, that 
Kuhn’s account is true and false, i.e., that if his account is true, it is false. 
In addition, if Kuhn’s account of the development of science is true, evolutionary 
theory would also be true because evolutionary theory goes hand in hand with the true 
account of the development of science. If evolutionary theory is true, however, then other 
scientific theories, such as the kinetic theory of heat and the special theory of relativity, are 
also true, given that the sets of evidence for the other scientific theories are as powerful as 
that for evolutionary theory. Since evolutionary theory and the other scientific theories are 
true, it is false that they are not closer to truths than their predecessors, i.e., Kuhn’s account of 
the development of science is false. Note again that the starting and ending point of this 
reasoning are, respectively, that Kuhn’s account is true and false. 
Kuhn might reply that his account of the development of science does not apply to 
evolutionary theory, although it does apply to other scientific theories, such as the kinetic 
theory of heat and the special theory of relativity. In other words, he might say that 
evolutionary theory is true, or closer to the truth than its predecessors, but other scientific 
theories are not closer to truths than their predecessors. So it is legitimate to appeal to 
evolutionary theory to argue that the other scientific theories are not closer to the truths than 
their predecessors. 
     The preceding reply, however, is problematic. It is not clear on what grounds we can 
believe that evolutionary theory is true, while not believing that the other scientific theories 
are true. We believe that evolutionary theory is true on the grounds that it explains biological 
phenomena. However, the kinetic theory of heat explains heat phenomena, and the special 
theory of relativity explains the behaviors of fast-moving objects. To put it differently, there is 
no relevant evidential difference between evolutionary theory and the other scientific theories. 
So if we believe that evolutionary theory is true, we should also believe that the kinetic 
theory of heat and the special theory of relativity are true.  
In sum, it is self-confuting for Kuhn to ground his account of the development of 
science on evolutionary theory. 
 
3. The Epistemic Status of Present Theories 
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Are present theories, such as the oxygen theory of combustion, the kinetic theory of heat, and 
the special theory of relativity, (approximately) true? Ruttkamp-Bloem (2013) claims that 
evolutionary theory goes well with her view that present theories have true theoretical 
constituents. By contrast, Wray (2011) claims that evolutionary theory goes well with his 
view that present theories will be discarded. This section aims to show that it is question-
begging for Ruttkamp-Bloem, and self-defeating for Wray, to claim so. 
Like other philosophers, Ruttkamp-Bloem (2013) compares the evolution of scientific 
theories to that of organisms. Scientific theories adapt to new experimental results and 
background knowledge, just as organisms adapt to their new environments: 
 
Thus, in this context what is most seductive about the notion of evolution are (1) the idea of 
never-ending infinitesimal adaptation, and the result of such adaptation being the generation of 
more complex – more nuanced, refined – forms of whatever is doing the adapting – scientific 
theories in this case; (Ruttkamp-Bloem, 2013: 207) 
 
In other words, scientific theories are revised in the light of new empirical data and 
background theories, just as organisms change their morphologies in response to changes in 
their environments. Ruttkamp-Bloem uses this analogy to defend a position that she calls 
naturalized realism. Naturalized realism claims, among other things, that “we can justifiably 
believe those constituents of theories that have been revised to various degrees or that have 
remained unrevised in the face of change at the empirical level” (Ruttkamp-Bloem, 2013: 
209).  
Let me call adapted theories the theories which have been revised in the light of new 
experimental data and background theories, or the ones which have theoretical constituents 
that are stable despite the change of experimental data and background theories. Are adapted 
theories (approximately) true or completely false? Ruttkamp-Bloem does not explicitly say 
that they are (approximately) true, but it is more reasonable to interpret naturalized realism as 
asserting that they are. After all, if naturalized realism asserts that they were completely false, 
‘naturalized realism’ would clearly be a misnomer, and ‘naturalized antirealism’ would be the 
right nomenclature. 
Is it legitimate to appeal to the analogy between the revision of scientific theories and 
the adaptation of biological organisms to defend naturalized realism? My answer is that 
making such an appeal is circular. The appeal to the analogy presupposes that evolutionary 
theory has true constituents, i.e., it is (approximately) true. After all, if evolutionary theory is 
utterly false, the analogy would be inadequate to justify any philosophical position. 
Naturalized realism, however, asserts that adapted theories, including evolutionary theory, are 
(approximately) true. Note that naturalized realism implies that evolutionary theory is 
(approximately) true. Thus, using evolutionary theory to defend naturalized realism amounts 
to appealing to naturalized realism to defend naturalized realism. 
Let me now turn to Wray (2011). He claims that Kuhn’s “evolutionary perspective on 
science is an important resource for developing an adequate epistemology of science” (Wray, 
2011: 8). He develops Kuhn’s analogy between biological and scientific evolutions, saying 
that old scientific concepts are discarded with the advent of new scientific theories, just as old 
morphologies are discarded when a species becomes a new species in nature. Waste and 
“destruction are thus as prevalent in the biological world as they appear to be in the scientific 
world” (Wray, 2011: 136). Wray’s contention that waste and destruction are prevalent in the 
scientific world, just as they are in the biological world implies that present theories will be 
discarded as past theories were.  
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It is useful to note in this context that Wray endorses Stanford’s (2006) pessimistic 
induction, which holds that “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a straightforward 
rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories” (Stanford, 
2006: 19). Wray endorses Stanford’s pessimistic induction as follows: 
 
Consequently, it seems likely that future developments in a field will reveal additional 
competing theories that are also able to account for the data, theories, though, that are now 
unconceived alternatives. (Wray, 2010: 371) 
 
If Stanford’s pessimistic induction is correct, present theories will be replaced by future 
theories which present scientists cannot conceive of, just as past theories were replaced by 
present theories which the past scientists could not conceive of. Future theories will differ 
radically from present theories in their claims about unobservables, just as present theories 
differ radically from past theories in their claims about unobservables. It follows that both 
past and present theories are not even approximately true.  
What are we to make of Wray’s contention that waste and destruction are as prevalent 
in the scientific world as they are in the biological world? If the pessimistic induction is 
correct, present theories, including evolutionary theory, are false. If evolutionary theory is 
false, however, it is false that waste and destruction are prevalent in the biological world. 
Since the pessimistic induction goes hand in hand with the false view of the biological world, 
it is incorrect. Note that the starting and ending point of this reasoning are, respectively, that 
the pessimistic induction is correct and incorrect. 
If the pessimistic induction is correct, waste and destruction are prevalent in the 
scientific world. Since the scientific world is as evolutionary says it is, evolutionary theory is 
true. If, however, we can believe that evolutionary theory is true, we can also believe that 
other present theories, such as the kinetic theory of heat and the special theory of relativity 
are true, given that the sets of evidence for them are as powerful as that for evolutionary 
theory. If we can believe that the present theories are true, however, the pessimistic induction 
is incorrect. Note again that the starting and ending point of this reasoning are, respectively, 
that the pessimistic induction is correct and incorrect.  
In sum, it is self-undermining for Wray to say that evolutionary theory meshes well 
with the pessimistic induction. 
 
4. The Success of Science 
Science has enabled us to produce genetically modified organisms, explain why a solar 
eclipse occurs, and predict when Hawaii will bump into the Kamchatka peninsula. Why is 
science successful? Van Fraassen (1980) and Wray (2007, 2010) invoke evolutionary theory 
to provide an antirealist explanation of the success of science, whereas Psillos (1999) invokes 
the same scientific theory to provide a realist explanation of the success of science. This 
section aims to show that it is question-begging for Psillos, and self-defeating for van 
Fraassen and Wray, to do so. Let me begin with van Fraassen and Wray’s antirealist 
explanation, since Psillos’s realist explanation is a response to it. 
Van Fraassen claims that science is successful because only “the successful theories 
survive – the ones which in fact latched on to actual regularities in nature” (1980: 40). Wray 
endorses van Fraassen’s explanation, saying that “van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation is 
superior to the realists’ explanation” (2007: 85) and that the “selection mechanism operative 
in science, like natural selection in the biological world, is essentially an eliminative process, 
getting rid of the least fit alternatives” (2010: 376). 
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Van Fraassen and Wray’s evolutionary explanation of the success of science is 
advanced as an alternative to Putnam’s (1975: 73) realist explanation, which says that science 
is successful because successful theories are (approximately) true. The success of science 
would be a miracle if successful theories are false. According to van Fraassen and Wray, the 
success of science can be explained not in terms of truth, but rather in terms of the survival of 
successful theories and the death of unsuccessful theories. So we need not believe that 
successful theories are true. 
     What are we to make of van Fraassen and Wray’s evolutionary explanation of the 
success of science? If it is warranted, the success of present theories can be explained without 
invoking their truths, and hence present theories, including evolutionary theory, are 
unwarranted. If evolutionary theory is unwarranted, however, van Fraassen and Wray’s 
explanation of the success of science is also unwarranted because it relies upon that 
unwarranted scientific theory. Note that the starting and ending point of this reasoning are, 
respectively, that van Fraassen and Wray’s evolutionary explanation is warranted and 
unwarranted.  
If van Fraassen and Wray’s explanation of the success of science is warranted, 
evolutionary theory is also warranted. After all, how can an explanation be warranted when 
its presupposition is unwarranted? If, however, evolutionary theory is warranted, other 
present theories, such as the kinetic theory of heat and the special theory of relativity, are also 
warranted, given that they enjoy more or less the same epistemic status as evolutionary 
theory. This corollary, however, goes contrary to the antirealist spirit of van Fraassen and 
Wray’s evolutionary explanation, which holds that present theories are unwarranted. So their 
explanation is unwarranted. Note again that the starting and ending point of this reasoning are, 
respectively, that van Fraassen and Wray’s evolutionary explanation is warranted and 
unwarranted. 
In sum, it is self-refuting for antirealists to invoke evolutionary theory to give an 
antirealist explanation of the success of science, as Seungbae Park (2014: 268-269) observes. 
There is a further problem with van Fraassen’s use of evolutionary theory. 
Evolutionary theory claims that organisms do not evolve toward a fixed goal, but constructive 
empiricism claims that science “aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate 
theories” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). These claims conflict with each other. So constructive 
empiricists have the burden of reconciling these conflicting claims, before they avail 
themselves of evolutionary theory for their philosophical purposes. 
Let me now turn to Psillos (1999: 96-97). He argues that van Fraassen’s evolutionary 
explanation is compatible with the realist explanation that science is successful because 
successful theories are true. Furthermore, he continues, the realist explanation is better than 
van Fraassen’s evolutionary explanation because the former is genotypic while the latter is 
phenotypic: 
 
Notice here that the realist explanation is compatible with van Fraassen’s Darwinian account. 
Yet, the realist’s is arguably preferable, because it is deeper. It does not stay on the surface – 
that is, it does not just posit a selection mechanism which lets through only empirically 
successful theories. It rather tells a story about the deeper common traits in virtue of which the 
selected theories are empirically successful. (Psillos, 1999: 96) 
 
For example, why do current mice run fast from cats? The phenotypic explanation holds that 
current mice run fast from cats because fast mice survived, while slow mice died. The 
genotypic explanation adds that fast mice had certain genes that predisposed them to run fast, 
while slow mice did not. Analogously, the phenotypic explanation of the success of science 
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holds that science is successful because successful theories survive, while unsuccessful 
theories die. The genotypic explanation adds that successful theories are true and that 
unsuccessful ones are false. The genotypic explanation dovetails with evolutionary theory 
more seamlessly than the phenotypic explanation does. Hence, the former is better than the 
latter. 
     What should we make of Psillos’s appeal to evolutionary theory to defend his realist 
explanation of the success of science? His genotypic explanation asserts that successful 
theories, including evolutionary theory, are true. So appealing to evolutionary theory to 
defend the realist explanation amounts to appealing to p to justify p. In addition, Psillos’s 
contention that his genotypic explanation is better than van Fraassen’s phenotypic 
explanation because the former coheres with evolutionary theory more tightly than the latter 
does amounts to the contention that p is better than q because p coheres with p more tightly 
than q does. Such an argument is circular. 
There is a further problem, I must add, with Psillos’s use of evolutionary theory. 
Evolutionary theory clashes with realism. Realism asserts that science moves toward truths, 
but evolutionary theory asserts that organisms do not evolve toward a fixed goal. Realists 
have the burden of reconciling these conflicting claims, before they avail themselves of 
evolutionary theory for their philosophical purposes. 
 
5. The Capability of Our Cognitive Faculties 
Our cognitive faculties enable us to perceive and conceptualize the world. They produce 
scientific beliefs, such as the beliefs that the earth is round and that water is H2O. Are such 
beliefs true or merely useful? Some philosophers deploy evolutionary theory to argue that our 
cognitive faculties track truths, while others deploy it to argue that they do not. This section 
aims to show that it is question-begging for the former group, and self-defeating for the latter 
group, to do so. 
Papineau (2006) uses evolutionary theory to argue that our cognitive faculties are 
reliable. Natural selection enhanced our cognitive faculties so that they produce beliefs that 
are not only useful but also true. In general, true beliefs are useful means to achieve the ends 
of longevity and fecundity. A gene that predisposes organisms to pursue true beliefs is 
beneficial for survival and reproduction. Papineau says that “any gene that made them desire 
truth in itself would have been strongly favored by natural selection” (2006: 74). 
Arguments which rely on evolutionary theory to defend the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties are called evolutionary arguments, as opposed to evolutionary debunking arguments, 
in the literature. Evolutionary arguments range not only over scientific beliefs but also over 
moral, religious, and common sense beliefs. The general scheme of evolutionary arguments is 
as follows: 
 
1. Animals that can successfully interact with the world have a higher chance of passing on their 
genes than animals that do not successfully interact with the world. 
2. Beliefs about the world that accurately track those states of affairs in the world are, on the 
whole, better guides to action than are false beliefs. 
3. Therefore, natural selection will favor those animals with reliable sensory and belief 
formation systems insofar as those sensory systems and beliefs have a bearing on the animals’ 
fitness. (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2012: 417) 
 
If natural selection favored cognitive faculties that tracked truths, the beliefs produced by our 
cognitive faculties would mostly be true. Thus, evolutionary theory supports optimism that 
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scientific beliefs, moral beliefs, religious beliefs, and common sense beliefs are mostly true. 
Note that evolutionary arguments presuppose that evolutionary theory is true.  
In my view, it is circular for proponents of evolutionary arguments to say that since 
evolutionary theory suggests that our cognitive faculties are reliable, our cognitive faculties 
are reliable. Their conclusion that our cognitive faculties track truths implies that 
evolutionary theory is warranted. Thus, to appeal to evolutionary theory to establish the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties amounts to appealing to p to justify p. Such an argument 
is convincing only to those who previously had the belief that our cognitive faculties are 
reliable. 
Let me now turn to Akins (1996). She argues that our cognitive faculties produce 
merely useful beliefs. The sensory system, for example, generates perceptual information 
which the motor system can use so that the  organism survives and reproduces. The 
perceptual beliefs need not be true to be useful to the motor system: 
 
For every evolved system, there will be a symbiotic relationship between the information 
gathering of the sensory system and the informational needs of the motor system–and the 
elegant solutions that evolution eventually selects need not involve any straightforward (to our 
eyes) “veridical” encoding of sensory information. (Akins, 1996: 353) 
 
The evolutionary consideration that our cognitive faculties are not truth-oriented but fitness-
oriented undermines not only scientific beliefs but also moral, religious, and common sense 
beliefs. Such arguments are called evolutionary debunking arguments in the literature. The 
general scheme of these debunking arguments is as follows:  
 
     1. We believe that p, because we have an intuition that p, and there is an evolutionary 
explanation of our intuition that p. 
2. Evolution is not a truth-tracking process. 
3. Therefore, we are not justified in believing that p. (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2012: 419) 
 
We are not justified in holding scientific, moral, religious, or common sense beliefs, if our 
cognitive faculties are designed not to produce accurate representations of the world but 
merely to raise the chance that we survive and reproduce. Note that evolutionary debunking 
arguments presuppose that evolutionary theory is true.  
What should we make of evolutionary debunking arguments? If they are correct, our 
cognitive faculties do not track truths, and hence scientific beliefs, including evolutionary 
theory, are unwarranted. If evolutionary theory is unwarranted, however, evolutionary 
debunking arguments are incorrect because they are built upon that unwarranted theory. Note 
that the starting and ending point of this reasoning are, respectively, that evolutionary 
debunking arguments are correct and incorrect.  
If evolutionary debunking arguments are correct, evolutionary theory is warranted. 
After all, evolutionary debunking arguments are built upon evolutionary theory. If 
evolutionary theory is warranted, however, other present theories whose epistemic status is as 
high as that of evolutionary theory are also warranted. If they are warranted, the evolutionary 
debunking arguments, which say that they are unwarranted, is incorrect. Note again that the 
starting and ending point of this reasoning are, respectively, that evolutionary debunking 
arguments are correct and incorrect. 
In sum, it is self-undercutting for proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments to 
appeal to evolutionary theory to show that our cognitive faculties do not track truths. 
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6. Conclusion 
Philosophers employ evolutionary theory to defend the positive and the negative positions 
concerning the issues of whether science moves toward truths, whether successful present 
theories are (approximately) true, whether truths should be invoked to explain the success of 
science, and whether our cognitive faculties track truths. When they rely on evolutionary 
theory, the defenders of the positive positions advance circular arguments, while those of the 
negative positions advance self-defeating arguments. A moral is that when evolutionary 
theory is at stake, philosophers should argue for their philosophical positions without 
appealing to it. 
That does not mean, however, that circular arguments and self-refuting arguments are 
equally problematic. In my view, circular arguments are less problematic than self-
undermining arguments. While circular arguments are merely unconvincing to those who 
have already rejected their conclusions, self-confuting arguments involve contradictions. 
Therefore, while the former has a chance to fly, the latter does not. 
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